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I.

INTRODUCTION

i

In the past half-century of psychological theorizing

and research, there has been a growing interest in the con-

cepts of mental illness and moral development.

These areas

both have man as their common element, but attempts to look
at their interconnections have previously been clouded by in-

adequate knowledge of the separate elements themselves.
Since this thesis concerns those interconnections, a clearer
and more concise exposition of the moral-interpersonal world
of the emotionally disturbed is perhaps called for.

Theory

To begin on a broad base, the works of Martin

Buber provide an inspiring and insightful philosophy of the

Interpersonal nature of man.

For Buber (1965), "The basis

of man's life with man is twofold, and it is one

— the

wish

of every man to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he
can become, by men; and the innate capacity in man to con-

firm his fellow-men in this way [p. 102]."

In contrasting

the I-Thou world of mutuality and relation with the I-It

world of experiencing and using, Buber makes vivid the life
lived between man and man, the life of dialogue.

In order

to fulfill his twofold nature, man must create a separate

self (I) with which to face the world, and yet must also

enter into relation with others (Thou).

It becomes each

person's responsibility and claim to live toward, rather
than away from, others, to be present when another makes a
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demand or a call.
A

tendency Buber perceived in the early forms of psy-

chotherapy, particularly Freudian and Jungian analysis, was
its almost exclusive concentration on the self, on the psy-

chological state of the individual.

Buber (1965) points

out the inherent contradiction in such an approach, writing

"The inmost growth of the self is not accomplished in man's

relation to himself, but in the relation between the one and
the other, between men... [p.

104]."

In Buber's system, then,

emotional problems are viewed as failures of dialogue, experiences of unnatural isolation from the world of community.

Whatever the causes, "A soul is never sick alone, but there
is always a between-ness also, a situation between it and

another existing being." (Buber, 1967

,

p.

1^2)

Therapists

who have closely followed Buber's philosophy see the goal
of therapy as one of helping a stronger self develop, and

then turning this self towards the world of others.

One

such therapist, Hans Trub (1964), describing the second

phase of therapy, says he "steps over to the side of the

implicated world and expects of the patient, by this time

potentially healthy, that he now break out of the self-

incarceration and turn towards the world with his whole soul
...[p.

499]."

Boss (1963), a disciple of Heidegger's and pioneer of

Dasein-analytic therapy, also raises the sights of psychology
from the personal to the interpersonal, from the psychological

to the dlaloglcal:

For we never exist primarily as different
subjects
who only secondarily enter into interpersonal
relations with one another and exchange ideas about
the objects all of us perceive.
Instead, as any
direct observation shows, we are all out there in
the world together, primarily and from the beginning, with the same things shining forth in the common light of all our existences, [p. 55]
In his discussion of emotional problems, Boss claims that
"no psychopathological symptom will ever be fully and ade-

quately understood unless it is conceived of as a disturbance in the texture of the social relationships of which a

given human existence fundamentally consists

... all

psychi-

atric diagnoses are basically only sociological statements
[p.

56]."

One essential aspect of the interpersonal world Is the

area of moral judgment.

Moral questions revolve around a

concern for and an awareness of other's needs and rights.
Morality cannot be an issue in an interpersonal vacuum, for
it requires

some kind of relationship to exist between men.

Both Buber and Boss stress the responsibility inherent in

living with others, and discuss the guilt that results from
a failure to meet these responsibilities.

But perhaps

Mowrer (1961) is the most direct in discussing this connection between interpersonal life, morality, and mental illness.

According to Mowrer "Man is preeminently

a

social

creature and... he lives or dies, psychologically and person
ally, as a function of the openness, community, relatedness
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and integrity which by good action he attains and by
evil

action destroys [p. 44]."

The central issue for Mowrer is

how the individual has treated others, how he has dealt with
the demands and calls of mutuality.

His deceptively simple

point is that "there is a connection between 'sin' and 'sickness', i.e., between how one deals with others and what hap-

pens to oneself [p. 229]."

Boisen (1936), a former psychotic patient, believes
many forms of psychosis to be the result of spiritual, or
religious, difficulties.

The word "moral" could be used

as well in this context.

From his first-hand experience and

observations, Boisen believes that "the primary evil... in

dementia praecox

.

.

.

lies in the realm of social relationships,

particularly in a life situation involving the sense of personal failure.

We have found one characteristic common to

the group as a whole; they are isolated from their fellows
...[p.

28]."

Having cited this connection between spiritual

conflict, interpersonal needs, and mental illness, Boisen

discusses the social nature of the religious need, and concludes that "the basis of all psychotherapy is the removal
of the sense of isolation [p.

210]."

Mowrer (1961), as we have seen, also believes mental
illness is a "social and moral illness"

(p.

91), and that

therapy must proceed along socio-moral lines.

A problem

with his work is that his description of morality remains
at this general level, and his view of therapy calls for

restitutive actions on the part of the patient.

Mowrer

admits to being out of his field of competence when
discussing morality.
For many years psychology has been attempting to deal with this emotionally laden concept, and
in

recent years has developed what appear to be adequate and
useful methods for this purpose.

Accepting as

a

working

hypothesis that interpersonal life and the moral world are
closely related, and further accepting that this moral-

interpersonal area might be of considerable importance in

understanding human social behavior, particularly maladaptive behavior, then we should examine closely the development

of the research area of morality to see if its present know-

ledge throws new light on old and puzzling problems.

Research

.

Swainson (in Kay, 1968), a moral development

researcher, makes the connection between morality and the

interpersonal world using the work of Martin Buber as her

justification in doing so.

In accord with Buber's belief

that the reality of existence is personal relations, Swainson concludes that morality emerges from relationships.

As

Kay (1968) describes Swainson's system, "morality emerges

from the tension between self and society [p. 98]."

The

tension is one between "a morality of being true to oneself
and the morality of relating to others [Kay, 1968, p. 98]."

The need for unity with others is an early physiological

survival pressure for the infant and child, and a later psy-

chological survival pressure for the adolescent and adult.
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Early, the needs for inclusion and affection
become crucial,
with control needs becoming more important to the
matured
and hopefully independent adult.

To live in the world with

others, and still exist as a separate human being, necessi-

tates a dual-concern in actions and judgment:

a concern for

one's independence and uniqueness, coupled with an equal

concern for one's connection with others and common humanity.
Moral development is a statement of a person's progress in

resolving this tension in his life, his success in living
with a world-view which recognizes a differentiated self, but
does not overlook the fact that existence is a social enter-

prise

.

In his early moral judgment research, Sharp's (1898)

major contention was that "there exist different types of
moral judgment, which are represented with varying degrees
of completeness in different persons [p. 198]."

This early

statement appears more insightful as Piaget's and Kohlberg's

work in this area is described below.

Sharp's method of

measuring moral judgment was to provide his subjects with
ten hypothetical situations involving moral decisions, and

have them resolve the situations according to their own beliefs.

This method is used in exactly the same fashion to-

day, some seventy years later, by Lawrence Kohlberg.

Sharp's

"objective attitude" enabled him to refrain from labeling
some answers "more moral" than others, an emotional modera-

tion that many future morality researchers were unable to
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attain (see Pittel and Mendelsohn's (1966) critique of

moral value measurement).
With Plaget's writings (in Kay, 1968), the stage is set
for the sequential level development of moral judgment car-

ried on later by Kohlberg.

According to Piaget, from a

morality based on restraint and rigid law, the child moves
to a morality of social experience, cooperation based upon
the intellectual faculty of reciprocal thinking, and finally
to a point of moral equity, a stage of autonomy of judgment.

Piaget'

s

complete four stages of moral development are,

egocentric,

2)

authoritarian,

3)

reciprocity, and

4)

1)

equity.

Intellect, the capacity for reciprocal thinking, for putting

oneself in another's place, bridges stages two and three,
while a growing humanity or altruism takes the child to the
final stage of equity.

Piaget offers reasons for changes

in moral judgment, one Deing the intellectual growth due to

maturation, the other two stressing interpersonal aspects:

increased dealings with peers as opposed to adults, and a
decrease in adult strictures and domination.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1968), who describes himself as

"inspired by Jean Piaget

's

pioneering effort to apply a

structural approach to moral development

[p.

25]," has

developed a schema for the development of moral thought.

It

consists of three basic levels with two related stages within
each level.

"These levels and stages may be considered

separate moral philosophies, distinct views of the socio-
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moral world [p. 25]."

A person is placed in one of Kohl-

berg's stage-level combinations on the basis of
his elaborative responses to four moral conflict stories,
the method

being markedly similar to Sharp's design.

Both Sharp's and

Kohlberg's methods (i.e., having the subjects resolve moral
dilemmas) conform to Pittel and Mendelsohn's (1966) recom-

mendations for the measurement of moral values.
jects'

The sub-

attitudes are viewed as subjective phenomena, and are

not evaluated with respect to societal norms or preordained

visions of "moral" and "immoral."

Sharp and Kohlberg evalu-

ate each individual's personal response to a moral situation

not in terms of normative or conventional values, but simply
as an expression of his own world-experience.

The subject

does not merely answer questions as to right or wrong, to

which the tester has the correct moral choices.

He describes

his own view of a morally conflictual situation.

Returning to the details of Kohlberg's theory, in the

preconventional or premoral level, the environment is more
important to the child than are actual human beings.

This

is a very physical stage of development, with moral values

residing in external, physical events or in physical needs,
rather than in persons or standards.

The "obedience and

punishment" orientation, a deference to the force rather
than the person of authority, characterizes the first stage
of this premoral level (Stage 1).

The second stage has been

called "narcissistic," egocentric," or the stage of instru-

mental relativists" (Stage 2).

Good behavior satisfies one's

own needs, and the only sense of reciprocity that
exists is
again a physical, ego-centered one. Exchange exists,

but as

Kohlberg says, "human relations are viewed in terms like
those of the marketplace [p. 26]."

The orientation to reci-

procity is a very naive one, devoid of the principles of
justice or gratitude--" You scratch my back and I'll scratch
yours" (p. 26).
The conventional level of morality centers on performing
a "good" or "right" role, being the "good boy or girl."

Order, and the expectations of others, must be maintained.
The third stage of development is referred to as the personal

concordance stage (Stage 3).

Here, the person performs ac-

tions which will please or help others, tries to fulfill a

"natural" role in society, and be seen as a "nice guy."

maintenance of good relations is all-important.

The

The next

stage within this conventional level emphasizes an orienta-

tion to authority, and can be called the "law and order"
stage (Stage 4).

The social order is supreme, and its rules

are fixed and binding.

One does "one's duty," and shows

respect for authority.

In every society studied by Kohlberg,

Stage

*J

is the most

frequent mode of moral judgment in adults

Concluding Kohlberg'

s

system, the third and highest

level is the postconventional or "principled" one, in which
"Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or

shareable standards, rights, or duties [Kohlberg, 1969,

p.
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376].-

Both stages in this level emphasize
a mutuality in
life, concern for others' rights
from a nonegotistic perspective.
There is a genuine and flexible concern
for the

social relations of life.

The first stage is the social

contract orientation (Stage 5).

Right action is based upon

consensus, or "standards which have been
critically examined
and agreed upon by the whole society [Kohlberg,
1968, p.

26]."

Majority rule is the value, with laws or rules
subject to
change if the society so wills it.

As Kohlberg points out,

this stage sums up the spirit of our American
Constitution.
The highest stage in Kohlberg'

vidual principles (Stage 6).

s

scale is one of indi-

Abstract, ethical principles

originate which are universal and comprehensive, and these
supercede formal rules or laws.

Mutual respect and justice

are emphasized, and the individual conscience is free and

creative.

The personal principles Kohlberg (1968) lists are

"justice, reciprocity and equality of human rights, and

respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons
[p.

26]."

The person runs a greater risk of violating group

norms or laws at this stage than at any other, even greater

than the risks of the premorally guided individual.

Kohlberg

(1968) has found that his stages of moral development are

relevant in foreign cultures (Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan,
Mexico, and Turkey), since all of these societies have some
basic institutions—family, economy, law, government

permit role-taking opportunities.

— that

.

11

The similarities between Piaget and
Kohlberg are evident.
Kohlberg's preconventional has the flavor
of Piaget 's
egocentric, Kohlberg's conventional, the spirit
of Piaget »s

authoritarian, and Kohlberg's principled stages have
their
parallels in the Piagetian stages of reciprocity and

equity.

Another cognitive-developmental researcher, Loevinger
(1966),
lists six stages of ego development that closely parallel
Kohlberg's moral hierarchy.
Stages

1

through

6

Corresponding to Kohlberg's

are Loevinger 's Impulse-ridden, Opportun-

istic, Conformist, Conscientious, Autonomous, and Integrated

stages

Having briefly summarized the sequence of stages In
Piaget's, Kohlberg's, and Loevinger's systems, it would be

helpful at this point to present some of the basic assumptions

underlying the theories of these cognitive-developmental
psychologists.

Kohlberg states (1969) that

The cognitive-developmental assumption is that
basic mental structure is the result of an interaction between certain organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world, rather
than reflecting either one directly. This interaction
leads to cognitive stages which represent the transformations of simple early cognitive structures as
these are applied to (or assimilate) the external
world, and as they are accommodated to or restructured
by the external world in the course of being applied
to it. [p. 352]

These cognitive stages have four major characteristics
(Kohlberg, 1969):
1)

Stages indicate distinct or qualitative differences

in modes of thinking.

These different modes of thinking
form an invariant stepwise sequence in individual
development. The speed
of development may vary, but the sequence
is immutable.
2)

Each of these different and sequential
modes of
thought forms a "structured whole." Responses
are not tied
to a particular situation or task, but
are evidence
3)

of an

underlying thought organization.
4)

Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations,

i.e., each stage is a differentiation and integration
of a
set of functional contents present at the prior
stage.

The

levels are abstract concepts, not age-specific stages, and
in the hierarchical model there is one characteristic, or

predominant, stage for each person.

In the Kohlberg system,

it is thus common for mixed-type scores to occur.

Here,

two stages of moral cognition are heavily employed in one

subject's responses

— one

of major importance and frequency,

the other representing a minor, but significant, percentage
of use.

These mixed scores can represent transitional

points from stage to stage (e.g., 3(*0), or can be examples
or separate and distinct moral philosophies (e.g., 4(2)).
In all cases, the score not in the parentheses is the major

stage of moral judgment.

Dealing with another aspect of the developmental theory, Kohlberg (1969a) discusses two types of regression to

lower stage usage that may occur.

structural regressions.

These are functional and

The functional regression (found by
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Haan, Smith,

&

Block (1968) to exist in some college activ-

ists) is the choice of modal usage of a premoral
stage of

judgment with the retention of the earlier capacity
to use

conventional and even postconventional thinking.

In a

structural regression there is a lack of awareness of alternative of higher moral points of view, and this type of re-

gression has been found to exist in some schizophrenics,
criminals, and people over sixty-five (Kohlberg, 1969a).

Additionally, in discussing moral development, there is also
the possibility that a person may have failed to develop

beyond a premoral stage, and so the concept of regression
need not always be employed.
The major characteristics of cognitive stages are the

theoretical basis of Kohlberg'

s

six stages of moral judgment,

and they can be demonstrated by taking another look at the

stages in terms of the differing conceptions of reciprocity
in each stage (Kohlberg, 1969).

From Stage l's reciprocity

of obedience and freedom from punishment, comes Stage 2's

literal exchange philosophy, followed by Stage 3's gratitude orientation and reciprocal maintenance of expectations,

Stage 4's work and conformity view of keeping one's word and

bargain, Stage 5's social contract between free and equal

individuals, and, finally, Stage 6's universal ethical principles of reciprocal role-taking.

The large distinction

between conventional and principled morality is significant.
Where the conventional moral thinker feels the social order

1*1

embodies the structures of reciprocity,
the principled
thinker believes the social order itself
is derived from
the principles of justice and principles
of universalized
reciprocity (Kohlberg, 1969, pp. 398-399).
What Kohlberg means by morality is the way
the individual structures his relations with others,
the way he
lives

and acts in society.

Kohlberg'

s

conceptualizations are

a

natural progression from the work of Buber and the
inter-

personal theorists previously mentioned, only in Kohlberg's
they are tied to an empirical measure of cognitive development.

Kohlberg (1969) sounds strikingly similar to Buber

when he claims that
The direction of social or ego development is
also toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between
the self's actions and those of others toward the
self ... social cognition always involves roletaking, i.e., awareness that the other is in some
way like the self, and that the other knows or is
responsive to the self in a system of complementary
expectations, [p. 3^9]

Buber uses terms such as "inclusion" or "making-present" to
describe putting yourself in another's situation and experiencing an encounter from his pole of the relationship.
a more literary

fashion, Buber supports Kohlberg

1

s

In

view with

this description of role-taking:

This "making-present" increases until it is a
paradox in the soul when I and the other are embraced by a common living situation, and the pain
which I inflict upon him surges up in myself, revealing the abyss of the contradictoriness of life
between man and man. [Buber, 1965, p. 103]

The stages or moral development actually represent the suc-

cessive shapes which the perfecting, refining, and tuning
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of this capacity for reciprocity take.

To be able to exper-

ience honestly an interaction from the
other person's perspective requires, at least, conventional
moral judgment,
and this ability is absent in the premoral
stages.
Being
separate and alone in a world of others, being
at once an

individual and a social creature, places certain
demands on
the human being.
Kohlberg (1969) calls this "the area
of

the conflicting claims of selves... the area of
morality, or

of moral conflict [p. 398].

Overview of the study

.

M

The interpersonal world of the

emotionally disturbed has been described as limited and
isolated, their patterns of relating have been viewed

effectual, confused, or narcessistic

,

as'

in-

and their guilt over

personal experiences and failures has seemed self-destructive
in the light of their incapacity to change their way of life.

In more psychological language, they may be experiencing few

role-taking opportunities, leading lives which become more
and more private as the years slip by.

And what is more,

they may be unable to make use of any new opportunities for

relation which may arise, since their way of viewing the
world may have ruled out certain types of experiences in their
lives.

All of these descriptions and hypotheses are con-

gruent with the picture of the premoral individual's world

given in the Kohlberg Scale of Moral Development.

The actual

exploration of the socio-moral world of the emotionally disturbed is the basis for the following study.

By administering

.

16

matched groups of mental patients
and of control medical patients, it
was hoped to detect differential trends in moral Judgment between
the two populations

Within the mentally disturbed group, the
social alienation and withdrawal of the schizophrenic,
and the tense,

anxiety-dominated interpersonal world of the neurotic,
would
lead one to predict a more primitive, or more
premoral, ori-

entation in these groups than in a group of "normal"
subjects
Morality develops as relational capacity develops, and
sophis

ticated moral judgment cannot exist in an interpersonal
void.
The descriptions of the existential death of the schizo-"

phrenic points to both an interpersonal and

a

moral failure.

If others are not perceived as real, how can their interests
figure heavily in the moral judgments of the schizophrenic?

Indeed, it could be hypothesized that proceeding from the

schizophrenic, to the neurotic, to the psychologically "normal" medical control patient, the socio-moral world defined
by Kohlberg's stages should increase from the premoral to

the conventional level.

Moral judgment, intuitively, should

show the same relationship to these groups as does the quality of interpersonal life, increasing in effectiveness, mutu-

ality, and sophistication as one proceeds from the disturbed
to the more or less "normal" or adjusted.

The importance of

this moral-interpersonal realm has been discussed above.

The

knowledge of a person's cognitive stage of moral development
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can have Implications for the overall
understanding of

pathological states, and it may serve as a foundation
for
effective psychotherapy.
This study is exploratory in nature, and can be
viewed
as an initial attempt to apply the Kohlberg Moral
Judgment

system to personality disorders.

It is hoped that the rele-

vance of moral-interpersonal issues in understanding psycho-

logical disturbance may be established through the use of
the Kohlberg system.

I
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II.

Subjects.

METHODOLOGY

Sixty male veterans from the Kingsbridge

Veterans Administration Hospital, Bronx, New
York, agreed
to participate in the study.

The experimental group con-

sisted of thirty patients from the three psychiatric
wards
of the hospital, and the control group consisted
of thirty

patients from the medical wards of the same hospital.

No

medical patient employed in the study had previously spent
time on a psychiatric ward.

Medical patients were employed

as control Ss because they shared the general experience
of

being hospitalized in a VA facility, and they came from
similar socio-economic groups.

The educational level and

socio-economic status of both the experimental and control
groups were evaluated on the basis of the patient's statement of education and occupation.

The two groups were found

to be largely equivalent on these factors.

The criterion for the selection of the mental patient

group was simply hospitalization for emotional problems.
This group turned out, based on their most recent official

diagnosis, to consist of twenty schizophrenic and ten neurotic patients.

This diagnosis was determined at the pa-

tient's psychiatric interview following his admission to the
hospital.

The varying types of schizophrenia and neurosis

noted in these thirty diagnoses seemed sufficiently vague
and unsubstantiated to warrant looking at the three groups
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in the study (medical controls, neurotics,
and schizo-

phrenics) simply as roughly hewn points along
a continuum
of increasing emotional disturbance. More
detailed or
elaborate, explanations of results with regard
to particular

etiologies of various forms of schizophrenia and
neurosis
are beyond the scope of this study (and the present
state of

classification of maladaptive behavior).

The two major

groups (mental and medical) or thirty Ss each were matched,

insofar as possible, on age, religion, educational level,
socio-economic status, and number of hospitalizations.
Measures

.

The measure employed was Kohlberg's Moral

Judgment Interview, which contains four hypothetical moral
conflict stories and corresponding sets of probing questions
(see Appendix A).

The method of scoring used was Kohlberg's

global rating system, where moral issues are scored within
each story, leading to a global moral stage score for each
story, and where, finally, the global stage scores of the

four stories are combined into one "global-global" stage
score for the individual S.
A subject might,

for example, give Stage

3

responses

for most issues in a particular story (some typical moral

issues are Life, Role Relationships, Punishment, and Authority), leading to a Stage

3

global score for the story.

In

combining global scores from the four stories into one

global-global score, an overall modal stage is assigned if
50$ or more of the stories are at that stage.

In deciding
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on this percentage, a mixed score (e.g.,
4( 5 )) ls weighted
1 for the minor code, which is in parentheses,
and 2 for
the major code, which is out of parentheses.
A pure score

(e.g.,

is weighted 3.

5).

A

minor global-global stage is

assigned if 25% or more of the weighted stories
are at that
stage.

A pure-type global-global score requires
15% or

more

of the weighted stories to be at that stage.
As a concrete example, a subject might receive a
global

score of
a

on Story I, a global score of 3(4) on Story III,

3

global score of

Story VIII.

k

on Story IV, and a global score of

3

on

Using the weighted scores, the following chart

can be constructed:

Moral Stages

12
Story

3

4

8

4

5

6

I

Story III

Story IV

Story VIII

(67%)

(33%)

This yields a global-global score of 3(*0, Stage

modal stage of usage (above 50%), and Stage

4

3

being the

being the

minor stage (above 25% of the stories are at this stage).
The experimenter scored all protocols without knowledge
of the subject's identity of group affiliation.

The scoring

procedure was learned by the experimenter at a three-day
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workshop conducted by Dr. Kohlberg and
his associates at
Harvard University in June of 1970.

Procedure

.

The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview
was

administered individually for all Ss in one
session, usually
lasting one hour. Subjects were told that the
study con-

cerned finding out how patients in the hospital
felt about

certain issues.

Each S was then told,

will read some stories to you, and after each
story I shall ask you some questions about the story.
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, different people have different opinions.
I
just want you to give your own ideas and opinions.
This is not a test, and no one in the hospital will
see any of your answers.
I

Some mental patients and some medical patients were unable
to or had no desire to respond to the Kohlberg stories, and

so the final sixty Ss are most likely a naturally selected

group of the more cooperative (or passive), more interper-

sonally comfortable patients initially approached on a random basis.

Interviews of medical and mental patients were

randomly distributed over the five weeks in which Ss were
run, so that no one group was seen at a particular point in
time.

One difference in administering the interview to the

two groups was that the majority of mental patients were
able to come to an office to be interviewed, whereas the

majority of medical patients were confined to their beds and
had to be Interviewed on the ward.
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III.

RESULTS

Each S in this study received a Global-Global
Moral
Judgment Score (see Methodology section) which
consisted of
either a single modal stage of usage (e.g.,
3) or a mixedtype stage score (e.g., 3(2)).
The weights assigned to the

components of the mixed score, according to Kohlberg's
scoring procedure, are two-thirds for the major stage
of usage

(the stage not in parentheses), and one-third for
the minor

stage (the stage in parentheses).

The original Kohlberg

stage scores for the sixty Ss can be found in Table

1.

For

statistical purposes, a single numerical score was desired,
and so a simple transformation of the Global-Global ratings

was performed,

Using the weights described above, each

single stage score was multiplied by three (e.g.,
score

=3x3=9).

a

Stage

3

The components of the mixed-type scores

were multiplied by their respective weights (e.g., a mixedtype score of 3(2)

=

2x3 plus 1x2 = 8).

in this transformed system range from

3

The scores possible
(a Kohlberg score of

Stage 1) to 18 (a Kohlberg Stage 6).

Completely randomized one- and two-factor analyses of

variance were used throughout the data analysis, allowing
for simple and complex comparisons of moral judgment involving patient group, marital status, religion, age, and number

of hospitalizations.

Because of the disproportionate fre-

quencies of the variables that are found in these patient

populations, the method of expected cell frequencies was

D
c

TABLE

;
)

1

Global-Global Moral Judgment Stage Scores
for Mental and Medical Patients
Mental Patient Group

Medical rat lent Group

Subject No.

ouu j e

1
2
3
4
5
6

Score
4(3)
3(2)
2(1)

3

9

3(4)
2(4)

no

•

Score
3(4
3
4

3
D
0

3

3(4)

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

j-

3
2

7
8

z

2(3)
3

7

3

o
Q
t n
u
l

J( 5
3
3

3

2(3)
3(5)

1 C.

3

13
l h
H
X

2

IP

3

1
(

1 ft

4(3)
3

3(2)

1 Q
li>

?0
21
22
23

4

24

2

25
26
27
28
29
30

3(2)
3(2)
4(2)
4(3)
4(3)

3
3
M

3(5;
3
^\ D
1

.

4

3

ii

1 7
1

3(2)
4(3)
3(2)

it

)

lj

4(3)
3

3(4)

4(5)
4
3

5(4)
4(3)
4(3)

2k

employed for the analyses (Myers,
1969,

p.

109).

The first overall analysis compared
the two major
patient groups in the study, the mental
patient and medical

patient groups, to see if the hypothesized
difference in
moral development would be borne out. The
mean "moral development" score (all scores discussed in this
section will be
the transformed scores described above,
ranging from 3 to 18)
for the thirty mental patients was 8.96, while
the mean score

for the thirty medical patients was 10. 30.
this analysis are presented in Table

2.

The results of

The difference be-

tween mental and medical patients' moral judgment scores
was

significant (£<£.01), medical control patients, as a group,

evidencing a clearly higher level of moral stage usage than
did the mental patient group.

Dividing the mental patient group into its two subgroups,
schizophrenics and neurotics, and comparing the moral judgments now of the three groups in the study, the results showed
the twenty schizophrenic patients to have a mean score of 8.85,
the ten neurotic patients a mean score of 9.20, and, as cited

before, the thirty medical patients' mean score was 10. 30.
The analysis of the data, seen in Table

3,

indicates that

there is a significant difference (p_<.05) between schizo-

phrenic, neurotic, and medical patients' levels of moral judgment.

A

Newman-Keuls analysis was employed to examine the

nature of the differences between schizophrenic, neurotic,
and medical control patient mean moral judgment scores which

TABLE

2

Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral
Judgment
Scores for Mental and Medical Patients
Source of Variance

Patient Group (A)
S/A

*p_

< .01.

df

MS

1

26.7

58

3.13

8

53

26

TABLE

3

Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral
Judgment Scores
for Schizophrenic, Neurotic, and Medical
Patients

Source of Variance
Patient Group (A)
S/A

*R <.05.

df

MS

2

13.77

57

3.17

27

led to the significant overall
P.

The results of the Newman-

Keuls analysis (Table 4) indicate
that the significant difference in the overall analysis
of variance was accounted
for by the difference (.0
5 < E <.0 7 5) between schizophrenic
patient and medical control patient
mean moral judgment
scores.
The fact that the analysis of
variance comparing
schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical
patients' moral judgment scores was significant at the
.05 level, while the only
significant difference in the Newman-Keuls
method was slightly
above that level may be explained by
noting that the NewmanKeuls is a less powerful test than is the
analysis of variance
Along with the main effect of patient group,
other personality variables might be interacting with
moral judgment.

Marital status is one such variable.

Due to the naturally

occurring frequencies of this variable in these patient
groups
it was not matched across patient populations.

Contrasting

first the combined effects of marital status (single as op-

posed to married, separated, or divorced), and patient group
(mental or medical), Table

5

provides the basic information

of sample size and group moral judgment score means.

There

is an increase of approximately one point across both vari-

ables, either proceeding from single to married individuals

within a patient group, or proceeding from mental to medical
patient status at either level of the marriage variable.

The

mental patient group's moral judgment scores were lower than
the medical patient group's by approximately one point in
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TABLE

4

i

Newman-Keuls Analysis of Difference in Moral
Judgment
Scores for Schizophrenic, Neurotic,
and Medical Patients
Schizophrenic
8.85

Schizophrenic 8.85
Neurotic

Neurotic
9.20

.35

9.20

Medical

Medical
10.30
1.45
1.10

10. 30

*.05 <p_ <

.

075.

Schizophrenic

—

Neurotic

Medical

Note.
Treatments underlined by a common line do not differ
from each other; treatments not underlined by a common line
do differ.

TABLE

5

Group Moral Judgment Score Means and
Sample Size
(in Parentheses) for Single Mental
Patients
Married Mental Patients, Single Medical
Patients, and Married Medical Patients
'

Mental
~-

—

-

1

X

—

.

=

—

Medical

1

,

8.46

X = 9.5

(N = 15)

(N = 8)

X

X = 10.59

Single

=

9.46

Married
(N = 15)

(N = 22)

.
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both marital conaitions.

Indeed, a single medical patient's

score was slightly higher than a married
mental patient's.
The analysis of these results, Table
6, indicates that the

main effect of the difference between mental
and medical
patients was again significant (p_<.05), and

also shows that

the main effect of the difference between
single and married

patients was significant (p_<.05) as well, married
individuals
showing a higher stage of moral development. No
interaction
effect was apparent.

If instead of two patient groups (men-

tal and medical), this population is divided into three
groups

(schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical— see sample sizes and
group means in Table 7), and the same two-factor analysis of

variance is run, the results, as shown in Table

8,

evidence

the same significant difference (p_<.05) between single and

married patients across the three groups.

The main effect

for the differences between the three patient groups was re-

duced to slightly above the .05 level as a result of this

breakdown of the patient group variable from two to three
groups.

Again, there was no significant interaction effect

present
In a study of moral judgment the variable of religion
is certainly of interest, and it was explored in this research

Ss stated their own religious affiliation, with four Ss ex-

pressing no affiliation and therefore being eliminated from
this analysis.

It was impossible to divide the patient groups

into two subgroups because of the extremely small sample size
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TABLE
Anal

f

ariance

Comparison of Moral Judgment Scores
Y
rni%?
for
Single
and Married Mental and Medical
Patients

Source of Variance

Patient Group (A)

Marital Status (B)
AB

S/AB

*p_

6

df

i

l8<1

loo
1

l4>2

1

3.3

56

< .05

MS

2>9?

p

6
^

^
g#

1.11

TABLE

7

Group Moral Judgment Score Means
and Sample Size
< in Parentheses)
for Single and Married
Schizophrenic, Neurotic, and Medical
Patients

Schizophrenic

Neurotic

Medical
1

X = 8.20

Single
(N

=

10)

X =

9

X = 9.5

(N = 5)

(N =

X = 9.5

X = 9.4

X = 10.59

(N = 10)

(N = 5)

(N = 22)

Married

8)

—

33

TABLE

8

Analysis of Variance Comparison of
Moral JuoVment
Scores for Single and Married
Schizophrenic
Neurotic, and Medical Patients
Source of Variance

df

MS

Patient Group (A)

2

9.1

2.99

Marital Status (B)

1

15>5

5.09

AB

S/AB

*p_

< .05

2

.66

54

3>o4

.22

3^

of some of the resulting cells in
this analysis.
Mean
scores and sample sizes for combinations
of patient group
and religious affiliation (Catholic,
Protestant, and Jewish)
are found in Table 9.
The analysis of these data, seen in
Table 10, shows a significant main effect
differentiating
the two patient groups once again
(p_<.05), shows no significant main effect differentiating the various
religious

affiliations, but does show a significant interaction
between patient group and religious affiliation
(p_<.01).

A

graph of this interaction, along with a Newman-Keuls
analysis
to discover the sources of significance in the
interaction

effect, are shown in Figure

and Table 11, respectively.

1

The significant difference in the overall interaction effect
lies in the difference between Jewish mental and Jewish medical patients (p_<.05).

Of the six cells in this analysis,

the mean score of Jewish mental patients is the lowest (8.36),

while the mean score of Jewish medical patients is the highest

(11.20).

This single difference among cells accounted

for the significant interaction effect found in this analysis.

The sample sizes of these two groups (Jewish mental patients
=

8,

Jewish medical patients

=

5)

were quite small, however,

so that this difference, while statistically reliable, is not
a clearly

established one.

Another variable of interest in discussing the development of moral judgment is the age of the

Ss

.

Table 12 pre-

sents the sample sizes and mean moral judgment scores for

)
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TABLE

9

Group Moral Judgment Score Means and
Sample Size
(in Parentheses) for Catholic,
Protestant,
and Jewish Mental and Medical Patients
Mental

Medical
• •

X = 8.72

X = 10. 41

(N =

(N = 17)

Catholic
HI)

X = 10.17

X = 9.50

(N

(N

Protestant
6

6)

X = 8.38

X = 11.20

(N =

(N

J ewish
8)

-=

5)

36

TABLE 10
scores for Catholic, Protestant,
and
Jewish Mental and Medical Patients

Source of Variance

df

MS

Patient Group (A)

1

20.9

Religion (B)

2

.6

2

17.3

AB

S/AB

*p_

50

C .05.

**p_< .01.

3.16

F

6.61*
.2

5.^7**
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TABLE 12
Group Moral Judgment Score Means
and Sample Size
(in Parentheses) for Mental and
Medical
Under Forty and Over Forty Years of Patients
Age

Mental

—
Under Forty

Medical
-

X = 9.0

X = 10

(N = 16)

(N = 12)

X =

X = 10.5

i

Over Forty

8.93

(N = 14)

(N = 18)

40

mental and medical patients under
and over forty years of
age.
The analysis of the data on
age in Table 13 shows the
expected significant (p_<.01) main
effect for patient group
(medical patients having higher moral
judgment scores than
mental patients), but shows no
significant main effect for
age, and no significant interaction
effect between age and

patient group.

Because sample size permitted it, in this

case the patient group variable was divided
into three

groups (schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical
patients), and
Table lk presents the sample sizes and mean
scores for these
groups' combinations with the two levels of the
age variable.

The analysis of the data appears in Table
15, and even with
this additional patient group breakdown, the main
effect for
the differences between moral judgments of patient groups

was again significant (p_<.05), but age as a variable and
the interaction of age and patient group were not significant.
One final variable of considerable importance in any

hospital-based study is the number of hospitalizations experienced by each S.

While the Kingsbridge VA Hospital is a

relatively short-term hospital, a division of patients into
those having under four and those having four or more hos-

pitalizations was possible.

The sample sizes and mean scores

for mental and medical patients in these groups are given in

Table 16.

A further division of the patients into schizo-

phrenic, neurotic, and medical groups was not possible with
the variable of number of hospitalizations due to the fact

Hi

TABLE 13

Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral
Judgment
Scores for Mental and Medical Patients
Under and Over Forty Years of Age
Source of Variance

df

MS

P
7.97*

Patient Group (A)

1

25.51

Age (B)

1

.07

.02

AB

1

2.14

.67

56

3.20

S/AB

*p_

< .01.

TABLE 1H
Group Moral Judgment Score Means
and
(in Parentheses) for Schizophrenic, Sample Size
Neurotic
and Medical Patients Under Forty
and Over Forty Years of Age

Schizophrenic

Under Forty

Neurotic

Medical

X = 8.85

X = 9.67

(N - 13)

(N =

X = 8.86

X = 9.0

X =

(N - 7)

(N - 7)

(N =

Over Forty

3)

X

10

(N = 12)

10.5
18)

^3

TABLE 15

Analysis of Variance Comparison of
Moral Judgment
T
f^^P^enic, Neurotic, and Medical
pTi
Patients Under and Over Forty Years
of Age

7

Source of Variance

df

MS

F

3.82*

Patient Group (A)

2

12.58

Age (B)

1

.29

.09

2

1.35

.41

54

3.29

AB

S/AB

*p_ <

.05

TABLE 16
!

Group Moral Judgment Score Means and
Sample Size
Se3) f ° r Mental and M edlcal
Patients
wifh Under ?
with
Four and Four or More Hospitalizations
Mental

Under Four

Medical

X = 9.16

X = 10.32

(N = 25)

(N =

X = 8.0

X = 10.2

(N = 5)

(N = 5)

Four or More

25)
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that no neurotic patient had more
than three hospitalizations.
Only ten patients out of the entire
sample of sixty
Ss had four or more hospitalizations,
and all five of the

mental patients with four or more hospitalizations
were
schizophrenics.
An analysis of the data on the number
of

hospitalizations (Table 17) .indicates a significant
(p_<.01)
main effect for patient group, but shows no
significant main
effect for number of hospitalizations, and no
significant
interaction between patient group and number of hospitalizations

.

The appearance in several of the analyses of variance of
F ratios less than unity raises the possibility that the-

model underlying the analysis has been violated in some manner.

Since one experimenter interviewed all

Ss

,

some subtle

systematic interaction effect might have been present, or

perhaps some unknown source of variability entered into the
analysis.

Definitive answers to these suppositions are not

available, but the frequency and size of the "under-one" F
ratios are net so striking as to challenge the use of this

method with the present data.
A story-by-story inspection of percentage of stage

usage (in this case, the original Kohlberg Stages 1-6) by

schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical patients (see Figures
2-5) shows differences between the groups as well as differ-

ences between general responses to the four individual stories.

The schizophrenic group used a higher average percent-
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TABLE 17

Analysis of Variance Comparison of
Moral Judrment
Scores for Mental and Medical
Patients with
Under Four and Pour or More
Hospitalizations
Source of Variance

df

MS

F

Patient Group (A)

1

26.66

Number of Hospitalizations (B)

1

3.41

1.09

1

2.26

.72

56

3.14

AB

S/AB

p_

<

.01

.

8.49*
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age of Stage

responses over the four stories
{21%) than

2

did either the neurotic (15*) or the
medical (Q%) groups.

Additionally, schizophrenic patients employed
more Stage
thinking (again, an average of the usage

H

in the four stories),

30*, than did the neurotic group (20%).

The medical patient

group, however, showed the highest average
percentage of

Stage

k

thinking (24*) of all three patient groups.

The

neurotic patient group, on the other hand, was the
highest
average percentage user of Stage 3 thinking
followed
(53%)
,

by the medical patients (45*), and the schizophrenic
group
(40*).

Stage

5

thinking was not heavily used, accounting for

10* of normal subject usage, 11* of neurotic patient usage,

and only 1% of schizophrenic usage.

Looking at combined

group responses to the four stories, for Situations I, III,
and VIII, Stage

moral judgment.

3

is

clearly the most frequently used form of

The exception is Situation IV, which drew a

predominately (44*) Stage
who were given this story.

4

response from the fifty-nine Ss
(See Figures 6-9.)
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IV.

DISCUSSION

A new approach to psychopathology
research

.

In other

sections of this thesis an attempt
was made to conceptually
tie together the areas of morality,
interpersonal life, and

emotional disorders.

One problem the interpersonal-

existential view of mental illness has faced
in the past has
been the challenges from psychologists
of different theoretical persuasions that the above-mentioned
connections
are

flimsy, literary, ivory-tower speculations.

The work of

Kohlberg in creating a system, a measure, and a
scale of
moral development may help to provide some answer
to

critics

of the humanistic approach to mental illness.

Kohlberg

1

s

contention that morality consists of the way

the individual structures his relations with others,
his

emphasis on the necessity of role-taking opportunities for
the development of reciprocity and mutuality, can lead to

hypotheses about the emotionally disturbed.

Combining the

new information on moral development with already existing

interpersonal theories may make possible a broader picture
of the world of the mentally ill.

This study represents an

exploration of the possible relevance of the Kohlberg measure
to emotional disturbance, and some comments relating to the

practical aspects of employing the Kohlberg system may be of
help to future psy chopathology researchers.
First, the interview in which the moral conflict stories
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and their probe questions were
presented was found to be an
excellent format for interacting with
both mental patients
and normal control subjects.
The method is flexible enough
to allow for additional probing of
any key areas, it can

withstand several interruptions in
administration to accommodate anxious patients, and, most
importantly,
it has as

its basis the relationship between
interviewer and respondent
The Kohlberg interview can be seen as a
structured clinical

interview, since no test is actually being taken,
all the

patient's responses are verbal, and a degree of
rapport can
be established in the situation.

The interviewer, in an

intuitive sense, learns more about the patient than his

Kohlberg stage of moral judgment after spending an hour with
him in discussion of the conflict stories.

This additionally

informative aspect of the interview can be of especial importance in the hospital setting, where knowing the patient
should be a goal along with the acquisition of research information.

While the Kohlberg system does make the concept of

morality researchable

,

and does provide a framework in which

interpersonal life and mental illness can be included, it
does present some practical problems for the researcher.

First, scoring is complicated, requiring careful analysis of
all the subject's responses.

Training by Kohlberg and his

assistants at their yearly workshop is a necessity at this
point in time.

Kohlberg's scoring manual, as of this date,
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is still sketchy, and it is
liable to leave the scorer
basing a number of judgments on
his intuitive feel for the

stage system.

Even with

a

detailed scoring manual, it would

still be crucial to learn and
understand Kohlberg's system
before attempting to score protocols.
This is not a test
with a key for scoring, and theoretical
knowledge is indispensable to the competent scorer. So
the demands
on the

future scorer for training, theoretical
understanding, and
time for scoring itself, are large for
the Kohlberg measure.
The benefits, however, include the use
of a measure that

allows the subject to define his own socio-moral
world

a

measure supported by substantial research and
validation.
It is to be hoped that researchers in the
fields of inter-

personal relations and psychopathology will attempt to
employ this measure, and keep pace with the new findings
of

Kohlberg and others in the presently fast-evolving field of
moral development research.

Schizophrenic, neurotic, and normal moral Judgment

.

In

this study, the Kohlberg system was employed in an attempt
to understand the nature of the socio-moral world of the

schizophrenic, neurotic, and "normal" individual.

The find-

ing of the greatest general significance in this study is
that the socio-moral world of the schizophrenic is different

from that of the "normal" individual.

It

is a more primitive,

withdrawn, non-mutual mode of experiencing the world, a more
extreme instance of a failure of relation than is found in
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a "normal" individual's moral
Judgments.

Most striking is

the schizophrenic group's reliance
on Stage

2

Instrumental

Relativist thinking, which comprised
approximately T(% of
their overall stage usage.
A more vivid and complete
sketch
of the premoral approach of
schizophrenics can possibly be
obtained by a further description of
the quality of Stage 2
thinking.
Several theoretical formulations of the
schizophrenic experience may also be helpful at
this
point.

Of particular importance from the
perspective of the
present study is the work of Macnab
(1965), a clinician-

theologian who takes an existential look at the
nature of
schizophrenia.
Macnab stresses the significance of

Buber's

insights in conceptualizing the interpersonal experience
of
the schizophrenic:
In the person suffering from this condition
(schizophrenia) we may see varying degrees of
negation and distortion of all that is implied
in Buber's community, dialogue, and I -Thou.
Relation is diminished and reciprocity virtually
lost.
The It tends to predominate in its talkingabout, manipulating, observing, and experiencing
the other without entering a relation.
Meaning
and significance of life either are absent or
undergo distortions involving the categories of
time, space, causality, and substance, [p. 151]
A look at the characteristic judgments of the Stage 2

moral thinker clearly indicates an I-It type of existence.
The capacity for reciprocity exists only in an exchange or

revenge sense, as there is little ability ot understand the
other's feelings in a situation.

All actions revolve around

the self, and others are used for self-gratification or
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personal survival needs.

Indeed, others are experienced
as

"things" or "objects" in a
solipsistically defined world.
For the schizophrenic, "turning
toward the world" and
"entering into relation" with others
are extremely problematic areas, with the individual
often resorting to taking
the whole world inside himself to
avoid this tension and the
call to responsibility.
This is expressed quite well in
Stage 2 moral thinking, where the self
is the sole locus of
importance in the world.
All exchange is literal in nature,
with a definite payoff in store for the self.
In this stage,
other people exist, but they are not perceived
as feeling,

needing, or loving persons.

Thus, a pure Stage

2

thinker

might (in response to a Kohlberg moral dilemma) say
he would
steal a drug to save his wife's life, but only because
she
was a good cook and he liked to eat.

terms, no Thou is present, the Stage
or "real" with no one.

Clearly, in Buber's
2

thinker is "intimate"

The world outside the self becomes

increasingly objectified until the only source of life is the
self, and the internal world becomes raised to cosmic levels.
The crisis experienced by the schizophrenic can be

viewed, then, as a moral-interpersonal crisis, a lack of re-

lational capacity and mutuality.

Mowrer (1961) believes

"...that in neurosis and psychosis the afflicted individual
is in a moral and spiritual crisis... [p.

79]," and Boisen

(1936) adds that "...religious concern and religious con-

sciousness tend to appear whenever men are facing the issues
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of life and are seeking to
become better.

Whenever this

involves severe conflict pathological
features are likely
also to appear [p. 82]." While
similar moral crises occur
in some degree at some point in
the lives of most individuals,
for neurotics, and particularly
for psychotics, a smooth,

"natural" adjustment or resolution does
not occur.
The
crisis, at this stage, serves not to
facilitate development,
but to color, characterize, and
control the whole of life
itself.
In this broader context, Kohlberg
(1969a) comments
that "the crisis and turning points of
adult identity are

often moral.

Prom St. Paul to Tolstoy, the classic auto-

biographies tell us the dramas of maturity are the
transformations of the moral ideologies of men

[p.

95]."

Mental ill-

ness may be such a crisis, and can be such a turning
point,
but too often it becomes a way of life, leaving the
individual to create an existence out of his failure to make
a

choice, his failure to develop.

The work of Boisen (1936)

on successful and unsuccessful (or pathological) religious

conversions, and Laing's (1967) view of the "voyage" of the
mad are relevant here.
not be all breakdown.

As Laing (1967) says,

"Madness need

It may also be breakthrough.

It is

potentially liberation and renewal as well as enslavement
and existential death [pp. 133-13^]."

In moral terms, crises

can cause us to grow, to mature in our relations with others,

or they can cause us to run from others, from responsibility

and from adulthood, and leave us concerned only with our-
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selves.

The heavily premoral Stage

2

world of the schizo-

phrenic described in this study can
be understood as representing the less adaptive reaction
to the
crisis.

The un-

happiness associated with this state,
the experiencing of
the failure of relation, the yearning
for the Thou,

cannot

be avoided, it would seem, unless
a withdrawal from the

world is made complete.

In these instances, it is just this

"human" quality of the regressed mental
patient that observers note as being glaringly absent.
In most less severe
cases, the crisis rages on, for it still has
not been confronted directly and worked through.

For the neurotic individual, moral judgment was
found
to be not significantly different from the levels
of judg-

ment of either schizophrenic or normal persons.

The neu-

rotics' moral scores are slightly higher than the schizo-

phrenics', and are a good deal lower than the normal subjects'.

The ten neurotic individuals in the present study

appear to represent

a

middle ground of moral development

between the two extremes of psychotic and normal.

Some

basic differences between all three of the above groups are
revealed, however, in a consideration of their differential
usage of the various moral stages.
The schizophrenic patient employs the greatest average

percentage of Stage

2

thinking (27%), followed by the neurotic

patient (15%) and the normal patient (Q%)

.

patient uses the highest percentage of Stage

The neurotic
3

thinking (53%)

,

t

.
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followed by the normal group
group (40$).

And In Stage

4

with an average percentage of

{k 5%)

and the schlzophrenic

usage, the normal group leads
3 U*

f

followed by the schizo-

phrenic group (30$), and the neurotic
group (20*).
Stage
thinking was sparingly employed, with
normal and neurotic
patients using approximately the same
average percentage

5

(10% and 11$, respectively), and schizophrenics
barely in-

dicating any use (1%)
These percentages of stage usage provide
some additional
information to be used along with the contrasting
of mean
scores of the three groups in the study.
The neurotic patient's moral judgment consists mainly of conventional
(and

a small percentage of post conventional

particularly the Stage

modes of thought,

)

conception of the "good boy" role,

3

of maintaining societal expectations.

While the schizo-

phrenic patient also uses a good deal of Stage

3

thinking,

he also relies on an extremely high percentage of Stage

usage and is virtually devoid of Stage

5

2

thinking.

The similarity between the mean scores of schizophre-

nic and neurotic patients seems to be due in part to the

schizophrenic's high amount of Stage
to normal group usage.

4

usage, second only

It is Kohlberg's

(1969a) contention

that normal adult moral development consists of the

dropping out of childish modes of thought rather
than the formation of new and higher modes of
thought ... the major change in moral though past
high school is a significant increase or stabilization of conventional morality of a Stage 4 variety,
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at the expense of preconventional
stages of
thought
Much adult moral stabilization
seems
to be not development but
socialization or internalization of the conventional
code? [pp. 106-108]
This is Just what appears to be
lacking in the schizophrenic

patient, despite his high Stage

moral Stage

2

4

usage.

The childish, pre-

mode of thinking is still important
to this

individual, and while conventional stages
of judgment are
employed, there is no stabilization or
consistency around
one stage, or even one level, of moral
judgment.

The range

of high-percentage stage usage for neurotic
patients centers
around Stage 3 thinking, with relatively
small amounts of
Stage 2 and Stage H thought being employed.
For normal patients, Stage

3

is again the predominant stage,

almost no use made of Stage 2, and Stage
to becoming the major stage.

4

there is

is drawing closer

For the schizophrenic patient,

however, the range of stages includes Stage
2, Stage

Stage 4, with Stage

2

and Stage

4

3,

and

almost identical in per-

centage of use.
The normal group, then, appears to represent the devel-

opment of moral judgment along the lines described above by

Kohlberg.

Normal individuals show a stable usage of conven-

tional judgments, with Stage

Stage

3

H

drawing, close to the simpler

as the modal stage of use.

The neurotic individual

centers his judgments almost exclusively in Stage

3

concep-

tions, showing few signs of progression to the more highly

developed Stage

k

concepts.

The neurotics' judgments are

largely conventional, but somewhat naive, based less on
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societal norms, rules, or standards,
than on hoping to fill
a natural or "good" role in society.

Conventional moral Judgments imply the
ability to live
in the real world with others, the
ability to take
the role

of another.

It is this capacity,

present in normal and neu-

rotic individuals, that is diluted in
schizophrenic moral
judgment.
By using a high percentage of Stage 2
responses,
the schizophrenic is autistically coloring
his moral Judgments
He may live and interact with other people,
but his unstable

basis of moral judgment provides for an easy regression
to
the physical, literal exchange philosophy of Stage

2.

There

is a quality of blind, frightened self-preservation
in Stage
2

thinking, a "looking out for Number One."

For the schizo-

phrenic, in times of stress of conflict, conventional modes
of judgment may be replaced by the simpler, less demanding,

more purely defensive moral stance of the Stage
The high percentage of Stage

k

2

thinker.

among schizophrenic persons

indicates their ability to employ conventional moral judgment,
but there is little stabilization at one stage or one level,

little natural progression from stage to stage.

The schizo-

phrenic can be seen as experimenting with a variety of ways
of living with others.
is lacking;

Consistency and stability are what

the faith in the social world necessary for a

relinquishing of premoral self-oriented concepts has not yet
been established.

The schizophrenic patients interviewed in

this study were those patients who were able to relate in
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some decree to another person,
who were in fairly good contact with the real world.
The more regressed, withdrawn,
and acutely disturbed schizophrenic,
it is hypothesized,
would have presented an even stronger
premoral aspect.
The predicament of mental patients,
particularly
schizophrenics, in regard to moral
development becomes
clearer if we note, once again, the
growth-medium of morality:

If moral development is fundamentally
a process
Of the restructuring of modes of role-taking,
then
the fundamental social inputs stimulating
moral
development may be termed 'role-taking
opportunities'
....The more the social stimulation, the faster
the
ln ° ral
dovol °P me "t. [Kohlberg, 1969, p.
399,
p

Social stimulation, "role-taking opportunities,"
are what
the schizophrenic lacks in his largely isolated
and private

world.

A point that is discussed in more detail below
is

that many forms of psychotherapy have as their goal greater

social, or interpersonal, contact for the patient, and this

stress on living with others may be aiding the development
of moral judgment.

The therapist himself provides role-

taking opportunities for the patient, and he may try to
make these mutual experiences more possjble for the patient
in the world outside the therapist's office.

This increased

social stimulation may be responsible for a consequent increase in level of moral judgment on the part of the patient
The re lation of other variables to mora l judgment

regard to role-taking, marriage would appear to be an

.

In
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extremely powerful social
experience that could provide
an
opportunity to aid moral development.
The closeness and
mutuality that are possible in
marriage, the opportunities
for confirmation of each partner
by the other,
make it

likely that this relationship
would be a reciprocal one,
each partner experiencing the effect
of his actions on the
other.

The results of the present study
do indicate that
marriage is strongly related to the
stage of moral Judgment
reached.
Married people, mental and medical
patients alike,
tend to show a higher level of moral
cognition than do their
single counterparts.
The effect of pathology, however, is
equally significant, and so while married
mental patients

might possess a higher level of judgment than
do single
mental patients, both these groups are at a
lower level than
either single or married normal individuals.
It is inter-

esting that, in the hospital studied, the number of
married
mental patients is far smaller than the number of married

medical patients.

It may be that many mental patients have

not been able to meet the interpersonal demands inherent in

marriage.

They remain single, thereby missing another op-

portunity for moral growth, and increasing the vicious circle of isolation leading relentlessly to ever-greater isola-

tion

.

In discussing interpersonal life and morality, the

area of religion easily comes to mind.

Both Mowrer (1961)

and London (1964) point to religion as once having offered
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people a sense of community, but
both these psychologists
now feel that religions have
failed in this endeavor.
London (1964) goes so far as to
say that psychology, or
science, will take the place of
religion, noting "the
clergy have tended to abdicate
their claim to moral competence in favor of psychology, and the
congregations
have,

by and large, resigned from their
clergy [p. 172]."

The

current popular obsession with encounter
and sensitivity
groups, and the various youth movements
(communes, Woodstock) seem to indicate that people are
feeling a lack of
and a desire for community.

Many people do not feel that

the conventional religions presently offer any
relief from

alienation or any hope for the future.

Indeed, Mowrer's

(1968) group therapy is a secular substitute for the old-

time religious communities, where secrets and problems were

shared not just with a confessor, but with the whole congregation.

As a result,

by the group.

the individual felt loved and respected

Perhaps Buber (1958) makes this substitution

of a psychology of interpersonal life for religious doctrine

more understandable in his discussion of the Eternal Thou.

Every Thou in the real world is destined to become an It at
some point in time, but God is the Thou

objectified, He is the Eternal Thou,

who never becomes

he can only be met

through the real I-Thou experiences of this world, each relation with a real Thou offering us a glimpse of the Eternal
Thou.

For Buber, then, the world becomes the temple, and
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prayer, doctrine, and formal worship
are only distractions
from the task of living with
others.
This would seem to be
a suitable basis for much of the
current emphasis in psychotherapy on interpersonal relations
(e.g., Mowrer, Laing,
Boss, Trtib).
All this is in preface to the expectation
that formal
religious affiliation would not seem to
play that important
a role in determining levels of moral
judgment.
In the present study, that proved to be the case.
Whether this is because the religions themselves are defunct, or
because the

members are insincere and do not truly live up to
the religious precepts, is an unanswered question. No
measure was
used to judge the seriousness of commitment to the
religion,
or the nature of that commitment.

The only criterion for

selecting the religious groups in this study was the patient's statement of affiliation.

Most importantly, no con-

trol groups consisting of either atheists or individuals

with personal (nontraditional ) religious beliefs were employed.

All that can be said at this point is that the

Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups did not differ sig-

nificantly in moral judgment.

The basis for the significant

difference between mental and medical Jewish patients (medical Jewish patients being higher in moral judgment) is un-

clear at this point due to small sample size and poor cri-

teria of religiosity.
The variable of age considered in this study also did
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not seem to have any relation
to moral judgments.
Since
all subjects were over twenty
years of age, and most were
over thirty years old, this is not
too surprising.
Differences in moral judgment in adulthood,
as we have seen,
center around stabilization of judgments,
which depends not
on the age of the adult, but on the
quality and nature of
his interpersonal and societal experiences.
A final point to note in reference to
the results of

the present study is the finding that the
number of hospital

izations for a patient was unrelated to his level
of moral

judgment.

It should be made clear that the hospital
used is

a short-term mental hospital, and so only five
out of thirty

mental patients had four or more hospitalizations.

In a

longer-term hospital, the trend may have been different, and
certainly the sample size of the many-hospitalization group

would have been more substantial.

In multiple, or lengthy,

hospitalizations, due to a prolonged experience of I-It
dealings with others, there could be a severe atrophying of
moral judgment.

These long-term patients might fit in well

with the institution's workings and routines, but they can
be seen as cogs in the machine, objects, "burned-out cases,"

and their moral judgments should be similarly regressive.

Moral development and psychotherapy

.

The logical

question that should follow after a description of schizophrenic and neurotic stages of moral development is "What
use can you make of this information?"

The question that

will be dealt with here is the
more specific , "What are the
implications of this and other moral
development research
for psychotherapy?"
At one level, the allowance
for, and general encouragement of, relatedness and mutuality
in therapy is of some

benefit to the patient in a moral sense.

It offers him a

chance to be real with one other
Individual, to be exposed
to another's moral judgments and
principles.
This raises
the issue of the therapist as a "values
change agent,"
bringing the patient more into contact with a
conventional

way of life, a way approved by society.

London (1964) claims

that this is an inevitable aspect of the
therapeutic arrange-

ment, that "the manipulative character of psychotherapy
can
no longer be in serious doubt either logically or
empirically... [p. 1573."

He finds no ethical conflict in this

fact, believing

The therapist's scientific job, from any viewpoint, begins with his gaining information that he
can then use to manipulate, direct, or channel behavior, whether the behavior In question is the
discovery of hidden motives, a change in habits,
or a realignment with society, [p. 158]

Rosenthal (1955) found that neurotic patients who improved
in individual therapy "tended to revise certain of their

moral values in the direction of their therapists', while
the moral values of the patients who were unimproved tended
to become less like their therapists'

[p.

^35]."

Rosenthal's

study, however, dealt with moral attitudes, not cognitively
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defined modes of Judgment.

These moral opinions seemed

largely based on socio-economic
class standards as to what
is right or wrong, good or bad.
The extremely small sample
size of the study (12) makes its
results merely suggestive.
One difference between Kohlberg's
stages of development and the moral attitudes and
standards mentioned above,
is that the Kohlberg stages are
content- free
That is a
.

person could respond in two apparently
opposite ways to a
conflict story and still manifest the same stage

thinking.

Kohlberg deals with the structure of moral thought,
not the
content of responses or surface attitudes. To call
the

therapist

a

moral change agent could mean only that he puts

pressure on the patient to mouth conventional ethical beliefs.

If this is the case,

the structure of the patient's

thinking, the actual nature of his socio-moral world remains
unknown, and the effect the therapist has on the area of

moral cognition is unclear.

London (1964) calls for the

therapist to employ scientific knowledge in his role as

change-agent, anu it may be possible for Kohlberg's research
to be used as a basis for a view of the therapist as "moral

development" agent, in a carefully defined sense.
An example of the difficulties a therapist can get into

if he deals only with surface attitudes and opinions in his

therapy, and if he is unaware of the stage of moral thinking
his patient is employing, is given in this statement by

Kohlberg (1969)

!

.
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The problem posed by stage theory
is
stimulus inputs received by the child that the
are usually
either assimilated to his own level or
are
ceived as stimuli at all. As an example, not pera Stage
Two delinquent is offered 'role-taking
opportunities'
by an understanding psychotherapist,
but these opportunities are perceived as opportunities
to 'con a
sucker' and do not stimulate development
beyond
*
Stage Two
[p. 402]

This example points to the value of viewing
moral judgment
as an important issue in therapy,

for whatever the value

system or therapeutic goals the clinican might possess,
his

effectiveness could be improved by a knowledge of what cognitive abilities the patient has in responding to his treatment.

This seems especially true for the schizophrenic pa-

tient, as he lacks some of the cognitive skills necessary
for conventional moral judgment and reciprocal role-taking.

The therapist may be able to proceed more efficiently by

structuring his treatment to the socio-moral world of the
patient
How can the knowledge of the patient's stage of moral

development be used to any benefit by the therapist?

First,

in a general sense, Kohlberg (1969a) writes "Moral develop-

ment involves a continual process of matching a moral view
to one's experience of life in a social world.

Experiences

of conflict in this process generate movement from structural
stage to structural stage... [p. 118]."

In dealing with pa-

tients who show a difficulty in moving developmentally from
stage to stage, carefully structured discussions of abstract
or hypothetical situations may help the patient to deal with
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his cognitive conflicts in a
more direct and successful
fashion.
Either a fixation at or regression
to a premoral
stage, or a confused scattering
of judgments across levels
can be possibly alleviated by a
clear focussing of attention on the moral judgment area.
The therapist could discuss moral conflict stories with
the patient, and could present various alternative ways of looking
at a moral choice

situation (not necessarily views which are
characteristic
of the therapist's own stage of judgment).
In an atmosphere
of a free exchange of views, the patient
can be aided in

reorganizing his problematic and unstable moral
judgments by
exposure to other opinions and resolutions of
moral-interpersonal conflicts.

A

natural development of the patient's

mode of moral thinking may result from this educational
ex-

perience

.

Dealing with the technical aspects of moral education,

Kohlberg (1969) writes
The problem of moral change would appear to be
one of presenting stimuli which are both sufficiently incongruous as to stimulate conflict in
the child's existing stage schemata and sufficiently
congruous as to be assimilable with some accommodative effort ... .With regard to the assimilation of
moral judgments made by others, the 'match' notions
just presented suggest that there would be maximal
assimilation of moral judgments one level above the
S's own .... Presumably a sense of contradiction and
discrepancy at one's own stage is necessary for reorganization at the next stage, [pp. 402-403]

Turiel (1966) tested this hypothesis in a study involving

junior high school students.

He found that exposure to the
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views of the stage Just above
the subject's own, rather
than
the stage directly below or
two above that of the subject,
resulted in the greatest learning
of a new mode of thought.
The method used was role-playing,
where the child
was ex-

posed to two contradictory solutions
of a moral conflict
story, both of which were examples
of stage thinking one
step above his own (or one below or
two

above, in the other,

non-significant conditions).

Turiel notes

Since subjects were exposed to new modes
of
thought through arguments Justifying both
sides of
a moral conflict, they did not really
receive solutions to the problems.
Such a situation, which exposed subjects to cogent reasons Justifying
two
contradictory positions, could have resulted in cognitive conflict arising from an active concern
with
both sides of the issue.
When the arguments were
too 'simple,' as in the -1 treatment, the subjects
may not have become actively involved.
When the
arguments were too 'complicated, as in the +2
treatment, the subject may not have understood them.
However, exposure to concepts one stage above, concepts within a subject's grasp, allowed him contact
with new contradictory ideas requiring thought.
Perhaps coping with concepts that had some meaning to
the subjects led to new modes of thinking, or to a
greater use of the stage that was one above the
initial stage, [p. 617]
1

How much of what a therapist says to his patient is either

rejected as too simple, or not comprehended because it is
out of the patient's realm of thinking?

It may be possible

to employ techniques similar to Turiel 's, i.e., role-playing
in discussions of the Kohlberg stories, based on a knowledge

of the patient's stage of moral Judgment, in psychotherapy.

The goal would be the moral education of the patient, the

development of his capacity for reciprocal role-relationships.
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It may be useful to examine
the area of moral development

and moral change in psychotherapy,
with especial regard to
those therapies which stress
moral issues and concerns.
Dealing with values, giving advice,
and assuming a
good degree of responsibility for
the patient's treatment
are not practices typically
associated with psychotherapy.
An increasing number of therapists,
however, are emphasizing
the importance of morality and
responsibility in working
with patients, particularly severely
disturbed patients.

Glasser's (1967) Reality Therapy aims at
helping the patient
to acknowledge a set of values as early
in the
therapy as possible.
We then discuss his behavior
in terms of whether he thinks he is doing
right or
wrong according to these values. There is usually
little difficulty in arriving at his values; the
difficulty lies in helping him to live responsibly
in accordance with them. [p. 129]

Glasser's contention, stated in different forms by

Buber and Kohlberg, is that self-respect and closeness to
others are the two basic needs of human beings.
in Kohlberg's Stage

1

and

2

Clearly,

thinking, a stable self, mutual

relationship, and responsible living are impossible.

So to

implement Glasser's ideas an effort would first have to be
made to expose the premoral patient to conventional judgments, to stress responsibility, reciprocity, and

with others.

a life

The method of choosing the stage one above

the patient's to be the setting for discussion of conflicting

moral choices, and the findings indicating

a

natural moral

growth capacity in an upward
direction, make the Kohlberg
moral development approach a
logical adjunct to Glasser's
Reality Therapy.
Glasser's model of emphasizing
correct
and responsible actions may
frequently be meeting the criteria of moral development by
presenting one-stage higher
concepts to premoral patients.

Mowrer

(l 9 6l,

196H) has often written that the
goal of

complete freedom for the patient is an
inadequate one for
therapy.
He comments,
My own growing conviction and that
of others is
that we are crushed, not by the tyranny
of the
culture but by our own short-sighted
attempts to
evade the cultural demands and live, as we
often sayy
'our own life!' [1964, p. 106 j

This is an apt description of Stage

1

and

2

'

thinking and

action, an attempt to live apart from others,
with the re-

sulting failure and dissatisfaction.
Lederer (1967) also emphasizes the need to build up a
'"superego" in appropriate cases, and he calls this
process

"pedagogic" therapy.

Although his discussion employs psy-

choanalytic terms that may obscure the issue, he is also

promoting a life with others,

a life based in society.

The

therapist, or pedagogue, actively encourages and educates
the patient in the necessary capacities required for inter-

personal existence.

Lederer (1971) feels this concern with

morality is justified, for
if desertion of morality indeed causes a sense of
alienation, and If alienation is the chief psychic
ailment of our times, then is it not the duty of the

.
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alienist the psychiatrist, to
concern himself
with morality, or rather, the lack
of it, as, at
of the posslble caus * s ° r lh *

m
asjx? \;rih

Describing the role of the psychotherapist,
Lederer (1971)
continues
Unlike the preacher, we do not advocate
any
particular code of ethics nor, by and large,
are
we to prescribe any particular course
of action.
But we must, I think, insist with our
patients
that they consider the right and the wrong
of
their actions carefully in the light of their
own
standards; that they expose their standards to
the buffeting of diverse opinion; and that
they
try hard to identify and to dispel excuses
and
rationalizations and to arrive at the essential
truth of their position, [p. 85]
The therapy hour can serve as a forum for discussion
of

values and of moral issues.

The Kohlberg system can create

some order out of the often confusing realm of morality.
It can explain moral Judgment in terms of developmental

stages, and it allows for a structural understanding of

different moral philosophies and the progression from stage
to stage.

Whereas Lederer discusses morality in general

terms, Kohlberg is precise in his distinction between levels
of moral judgment, and this can be of great help to the

therapist

Lederer (1967) writes,
The pedagogue maintains, as pedagogues have
throughout history, that life is a game that can
be played in many ways.
If one wishes to play it
well, he must first master it according to the
local ground rules [Stage 3 and 4 morality], and
the proper use of these rules permits considerable
freedom and spontaneity; greater freedom comes
from the recognition that the rules are largely
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Although the above discussion
provides a surprisingly accurate parallel to Kohlberg's
sequence
of stages, formal

analyses of both premoral and
highly principled modes of
judgment are absent.
In addition, a description
of how

development of forms of "game-playing"
occurs is lacking in
Lederer's treatment of morality. The
Kohlberg stage schema
seems to provide a cogent example
of how a' teaching-approach
or "pedagogic" therapy can actually
be implemented.
Relying
on his knowledge of the patient's
level of moral judgment,
the therapist, or pedagogue, can employ
the research findings on moral change to help the patient
move from more

primitive to more societal philosophies of
existence.

Once

at a conventional level, more subtle problems
in living with

others can be dealt with by a variety of therapeutic
techniques.

It would seem necessary, however,

for the patient

to be initially helped, in an active fashion, to develop

beyond his premoral, asocial philosophy of life to

conventional socio-moral outlook.

a

more

He needs to learn how to

operate within the system, at this stage in his development.
He needs to learn and to feel comfortable with the "ground

rules" of life in society.
This approach, using the Kohlberg constructs and tech-

niques to help the patient move along the sequence of stages,
is not aimed at

fostering a blind conformity.

As Glasser,
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Mowrer, Lederer, and others
have maintained, an active
role
for the therapist does not
automatically i mp i y a police
state or a therapy of conformity.
More specifically, in
the Kohlberg system the most
limited, rigid, and restricted
lives imaginable are those
lived by Stage 1 and 2 moral
thinkers.
Their physically oriented world
is frequently
threatened by life situations, and
their hermetic existences
make them susceptible to the
slightest pressures.
In contrast, the postconventlonal Stage
5 and 6 thinkers are free,
flexible, able to balance the demands
of self and society,
and are even capable of stepping
outside the society to
fight for personal principles of justice
and reciprocity.

Sophisticated moral judgment leads not to a
destruction of
the will, but to an emancipation of the
will, the creation

of a will which rises above the self to
include the world in
its concerns.
The therapist's values will become apparent in
a morality

based therapy, but the goal is never the patient's
acceptance
of the therapist's particular beliefs.

The therapist may

model the various Kohlberg stage responses to moral dilemmas
in an attempt to help the patient develop new capacities in

resolving cognitive conflicts.

Kohlberg writes in terms of

the existence of a natural trend to use more sophisticated

or complex stages of judgment, a natural growth capacity of

the moral judgment area.

The moral-development approach is

not authoritarian, but educational in nature.

The goal is
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to expose the patient to
alternative modes of thought, not
to espouse any one moral
philosophy or ethic. As Parlour,
Cole, and VanVorst (1967) write,
-...an active, directive'

stance by the psychotherapist need
not inhibit personal
development or the development of mature
independence and

responsibility [pp. 138-139]."
Indeed, a Kohlberg-oriented therapy
would help to avoid
some of the limitations often found
in morally based treatment.
Most importantly, the identification
with and stressing of a single moral concept or belief
(e.g., Mowrer's em-

phasis on confession, Glasser's focussing on
responsibility)
could be avoided by a therapist who worked within
the format
of Kohlberg's stage theory.
The distinction between
a

teacher and a preacher is crucial here, and the aim of
the

Kohlberg-oriented therapist would be to educate, not to convert the patient to a particular philosophy of life.

The

Kohlberg system is helpful in that it provides the therapist
with knowledge of a whole range of valid moral philosophies.
It is surely possible for the patient to rise to a

level above the therapist's, although his development into
the principled stages might well occur after the termination

of individual therapy.

A solid conventional moral philoso-

phy, with an emphasis on responsibility and mutuality, may

leave the patient capable of maturing without the continued

process of individual assistance.

The hypothesized need we

all have for community, the need to avoid lives of privacy,

°
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secrecy, and shame may perhaps
be best alleviated by
group
experiences, actual experiences of
community.
Group psychotherapy, then, would
appear to be an initial extension of the concern
with moral judgment and interpersonal life. Macnab (1965) maintains
that

If Buber's thought is followed
and accepted in
th
the medlum of the Kroup assumes
a
ffmSS
fundamental
role and significance, for it is
in
Sett ing that the Slck man mi ht
realize
S
MmL?r and rediscover
,
himself
the meaning of his life in
the world, [p. 151]

™',
i

The group-process has a more explicitly
"moral" nature in
Mowrer's (1968) Integrity Therapy group, where
the emphasis
is on confession of guilt and positive
actions toward others
in the social world.

Mowrer is concerned with and bothered

by the exclusively personal nature of most
therapies, and he

sees the need to turn the patient toward the world,
to break
up the secret and private milieu of therapy.

He writes,

What a terrible waste of time it is seeing a
'counselor' who never counsels us to do anything
but continue talking to him!
And group therapy,
while an Improvement over most individual counseling, can also fall short of full effectiveness if
it becomes ingrown and does not encourage its members to reach out to, and often incorporate into
the group, 'significant others.' [p. 1^9]
The Kohlberg moral conflict stories can perhaps provide
a means of turning the group to broader,

societal concerns.

By carefully selecting patients to insure a range of differ-

ent moral stages in the group, and by using a therapist who

understands the stage schema, the group could serve as
setting for

a

discussion in which individuals would be

a

.
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exposed to a variety of .oral
views.
result in patients' development

This would perhaps

from stage to stage.

While

the group could deal with
other, more traditional, issues,
this method of concentrating
on moral conflict issues might
be especially helpful to the
schizophrenic patient. Mowrer's
groups, stressing confession and
responsibility, require a
good deal of social skills ana
self-awareness, and there
would seem to be no place for the
severely disturbed schizo-

phrenic within them.

But if in addition to an Integrity

Therapy or other group therapy approach,
the group dealt
directly with moral conflicts, the
schizophrenics could be
exposed to higher stage thinking, and might
better be able
to participate adequately by giving their
own
opinions.

The

more they assimilated conventional modes of
moral judgment,
the more the group as a whole could operate
in a less struc-

tured fashion.

The Kohlberg stories might be used, then, as

an adjunct to other therapies, individual and group.

They

may be of particular Importance in their potential for
bringing the patient with the most alienated socio-moral world,
the schizophrenic, into closer contact with others and with

the community as a whole.

Conclusions and Implications

.

Man faces many paradoxes

in life, but one of the most problematic of these is his

simultaneous need for both individuality and relationship
One's actions, it is hypothesized, have to satisfy both needs.
A

balance must be established between the self and others.

This is the arena of morality,
which deals with the nature
of the resolution of this conflict
between man and society.
One extreme position stresses the
individual,

the self, but

the self seems to be unable to
survive in social isolation.
On the other hand, to live purely
for others is another

form of "losing" ourselves.
The Kohlberg framework describes the
different forms
this attempt at "balance" or "stability,"
or, if you will,
"mental health," can take.
For the psychotic, the non-

self of alienation is raised to unnatural,
eerie heights,
and the Thou, or relation, is longed for in
a private tor-

ment.

Understanding the psychotic's level of moral judg-

ment makes more vivid the failures of their interpersonal
life, their unsatisfied need for connection and communion

with others.

Higher moral stages, found in more "normal"

individuals, show an acknowledgment of the society, and
indicate some success in being a separate person while maintaining a relationship to others.

Identity is established

while relation is developed.
The moral-interpersonal realm deals with the person's

way of coping with this ontological paradox, and can add

further understanding to the concepts of what is "sick" and
what is "normal" behavior.

This additional knowledge of

the person's cognitive mode of moral judgment could be es-

pecially helpful to a therapist who is actively concerned
with these same issues of self-in-society

.

Man can be seen
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walking a tightrope, trying to keep
his balance, to be an
individual, yet to live in relation
with others.

When he

slips, when he becomes "unbalanced,"
he falls into the
safety net of the mental health
professions.
It is our

responsibility to understand his problems
and his failures,
and this implies understanding the
way he lives
as an in-

dividual with other people.

The more knowledge we have

about moral judgment and interpersonal
life, the more help
we can be to ouselves and to others.
The more we understand
the various ways of living-in and out-ofcommunity , the

better our "net" will be for catching the "fallen."

For to

slip through the net means to leave this world, and
drift
in a moral-interpersonal void.

Our goal should be to send

the person back into the social world, back into the world

of the

I

and the Thou, more capable of fulfilling his dual

and inseparable needs for identity and relationship.
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APPENDIX

A

Kohlberg Moral Judgment
Interview

will read some stories to
you, and after each story
I shall ask you some
questions about the story. There
are
no right or wrong answers to
these questions, different
people have different opinions.
I just want you to give
your own ideas and opinions. This
is not a
I

test and no one

in this hospital will see any
of your answers.
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I.

joe is a 14-year-old boy who w

J /Tf
« ^

»t *d
"

to go to camp
he Saved u*

.cry much.

His

C° Uld 8 °
money for it
I
6 W ° rked
at hlS Paper route and »aved up
tne
$40 it cost to co to camp and a little more
besides.
16

But just
before camp was going to start, his
father changed his mind.
Som
father was short of the money it would
cost.
The father told Joe
to give him the money he had saved
from the paper route.
Joe
didn t want to give up going to camp,
so he thought of refusing
to give his father the money.

90
I.

0.

Should Joe refuse to give his
father the toncy?

W.r-?

2.

Does his father have the right to tell
Joe to give
hin the
°
money?

1.

Does giving the money have anything to do with being
a good son?

6.

Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son
breaking a promise to his father?

6a.

Why should a promise be kept?
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HI.

^

Europe< a woman
death
fl
^^^^ ^
cancer.
There was one drug that the doctors
thought might save her.
ta the Sarae t0 "» h * d
*
discovered
tS
The *™
drug was expensive to make, but the
druggist was
charging ten times what the drug cost
him to make. He paid §200
for the radium and charged $2,000
for a small dose of the drug.
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went
to everyone he knew to
e
bUt he °° uld
Set together about $1,000,
?T
which is !
half of what it cost. He told the
druggist that his wife
was dying, and asked him to sell it
cheaper or let him pay later.'
But the druggist said, "No, I discovered
the drug and I'm going to
make money from it." So Heinz got
desperate and broke into the
man s store to steal the drug for his
wife.
I

™^

.

^"V

V

^

III.

20.

Should Heinz have done than?

23.

Is it a husband's duty to steal
the drug for his wife if he can
can get it no other way? Would a good
huoband do it?

25.

Did the druggist have the right to charge
that rauch when there
was no law actually setting a limit to the price?
Why?

it actually wron, o, right?

——

The next tw o questions apply only if subject thinks
Heinz
drug
:

23a.

24.

s hould

—

steal the

If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate
to his
wife, should he still steal the drug?

Suppose it wasn't Heinz 's wife who was dying of cancer, but it
was Heinz 's best friend. His friend didn't have any money and
there was no one in his fanily willing to steal the drug. Should
Heinz steal the drug for his friend in that case?
May?
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I

F

T"

^

^«

11111

-~ ^Qd

no.

...

Would you steal the
dtu8 to save your wife's
life?

If you were dying of
cancer but were strong Penou
nn
8
drug to save your own life?
Bh
,

i

»

would

steal the

Everyo ne

Heinz broke In Che store and stole
the drug and gave it to his
wife. He
h
brought before the
S*o»l/Z
jud
:
send Heinz to
E
I of
stealing, or should he let him
°
bin go free?
Why?

En

L^
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live?^ ^i/teSibuTaiV^t^'
\
»T„ „

^

°^

six months to
had
ab ° ut
but she was 80 ue ak
V
a good dose of pain-killer
that
like
sooner.
She was' delirious and al,
"*? be * dle
ost llaZf,
and ln her calm
P
periods, she would ask the
doctor to Jit I
eth
She said she couldn't
t0 kil1 her stand the P
Pain fnl that
th^
she was Soing to die in
few months anyway.
a

*

T"

T"*

"
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1S b >dl
''

put"!'
put
it out of
Till
<
its pain.

S!Ll"°!u
•

r

i

R

a!

tlon

'

"° U " ded nd WlU dl
°
='
!• billed to
the same thing apply here?
Why?

"

r
Does

applY onlv tf 8ub1ect

?

<n "° the d ° ct

"

—

41.

Would you blame the doctor for giving her
the drug?

42.

What would have been best for the woman herself: to have
lived
for six months more in great, pain or to have
died sooner?
Why?

The doctor finally deed fed co
kill the woman Ko nut her out
of
her pain, so he did it without
consulting the law. The police
found out and the doctor
brought up on a charge of Murder
rhe jury decided he had done it,
so they found him guilty of
Ch
thGy knP W the wornan had
him.
What
K °V? the
punishment should
judge give the doctor:
Why?

«
'

^

'

Would it be right or wrong to give the doctor
the death sentence?

Do you believe that the death sentence should be given in some
cases?
Why?
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p.? •s.-t-a-a ^-j
money and slowly built
up a
highest wa.es and used
nost of Kit
work in curing cancel
n y
recognized the factorv n,m
u 5

Mcf^

Z

J

u

....

»,

„

m

^^

Ke S *ved
8aVe his WOrkers

^tTS^LS^
,

,

3

"asseo when a tailor

f° r

98

VIII.

80.

Should the tailor report Reinz
to the police?
right or wrong to keep it
quiet?
Why?

81.

Is it a citizen's duty to report
Heinz?

84.

If Heinz was a good friend of the tailor,
would that make a
difference?
Why?

82.

Should Heinz be sent back to jail by the judge?

Would it be

Would a good citizen?

Why?

